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Abstract 
The global financial crisis has shown how important is the role of liquidity risk in ensuring the stability of the 
banking system, and revealed a number of deficiencies in its regulation, both at the level of individual banks 
and at the level of banking regulation and supervision. It is necessary to develop new instruments and improve 
of existing instruments for protection the banking system from the negative effects of liquidity risk. These 
tools necessarily include stress testing of liquidity risk. In order to increase the efficiency of liquidity risk 
management of Ukrainian banks at micro and macro levels, the authors propose to apply stress testing of 
liquidity of assets. The stress-testing model is based on three phases: the formation of a liquidity deficit in the 
balance as a primary effect of the shocks; bank reactions to shocks; feedback effects from shocks. According 
to the model, the liquidity buffer is calculated and the banks have sufficient liquid assets to cover the liquidity 
deficit. 
The model was tested on a group of Ukrainian banks with a state stake (JSB "Ukrgasbank", JSC "Oschad-
bank", JSC "Ukreximbank" and PJSC "PrivatBank"), the impact of which on the banking system of Ukraine 
is the most significant, based on data from 2012 to 2016. According to the results of the study, it was deter-
mined that with a sufficient amount of assets liquidity buffers in state-owned banks, their quality remains 
rather low, the share of secondary reserves in banks is critically low. For the crucial role of this segment in 
the Ukrainian banking system, it is necessary to improve the liquidity management system of this group of 
banks, including, in order to minimize the systemic liquidity risk. 
This test may use prudential oversight bodies as an appropriate alternative to available liquidity risk assess-
ment tools (primarily established by the NBU for liquidity ratios) at both micro and macro levels of liquidity 
regulation. 
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Introduction 
The liquidity risk at the present stage of functioning of financial systems is an important subject of banking 
regulation and supervision, as the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 has shown how operating conditions of 
banks' operations can change rapidly, causing significant liquidity disruptions. It also proved that the proba-
bility of systemic liquidity squeeze banks was higher than the sum of liquidity risks associated with each 
individual bank. 
This topic is also important for the banking system of Ukraine, as banks are forced to work in the uncertain 
environment of the operating environment, reduce capital adequacy, instability of the resource base and in-
crease the share of problem loans in the loan portfolio, which negatively affects the level of liquidity and 
increases the risk of liquidity . 
A significant increase in liquidity risk led to the reform of the banking regulation and supervision system in 
this area. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has initiated two new liquidity standards in global 
banking regulation, the Liquidity Ratio (LCR) and the Clean Stable Financing Factor (NSFR), designed to 
increase banks' liquidity buffers and financial sustainability, respectively [1]. The European Systemic Risk 
Board recommended that national oversight bodies strengthen their supervision of liquidity and funding risks 
(ESRB 2012) [4]. 
The National Bank of Ukraine in 2015 developed a Comprehensive Program for the Development of the 
Financial Sector of Ukraine until 2020, which provides for the introduction of LCR and NSFR liquidity ratios. 
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In 2017, a Plan of Measures for the Implementation of EU norms (CRD IV / CRR) and a Plan of Measures 
for the Improvement of Banking Supervision, envisaging specific mechanisms for the implementation of LCR 
and NSFR liquidity ratios in the Ukrainian banking system, were adopted. Starting from June 1, 2018, the 
LCR liquidity ratio was introduced in the test mode. From December 1, 2018, LCRs are required to be met 
by banks as one of the economic standards. The use of this indicator in micro-prudential supervision will 
increase banks' resilience to short-term liquidity shocks and will facilitate the approximation of banking reg-
ulation standards in Ukraine to European ones. 
In addition to the introduction of new tools for micro-prudential supervision, the growth of liquidity risks 
leads to the need to improve the methodology for measuring both the systemic liquidity risk (macro level) and 
the magnitude of the impact of individual banks on the scale of the formation and implementation of these 
risks, which will improve the mechanisms for their regulation. Currently, the key tool for measuring liquidity 
risks is stress testing as an assessment of the potential impact on the liquidity of a number of specified changes 
in risk factors that are consistent with exceptional but probable events. 
Objectives. The purpose of this research is approbation of model stress testing of liquidity on the data of banks 
of Ukraine with state participation, which is based on the recalculation of liquidity buffers after exposure to 
several types of shocks. The approach combines the risks of market liquidity and the risk of financing the 
liquidity of banks, and the feedback between them leads to a secondary impact of market imbalances on banks. 
Literature review 
The research is important but rather new for the banking system.  This element of risk management and bank-
ing regulation is stress testing, which attracts the attention of many domestic scientists. Theoretical and meth-
odological aspects of stress-testing of banks are investigated in the works of P. Zhytnyi (2008) [34]; S. Nau-
menkova and S. Mishchenko (2008) [26]; I. Ivasiv (2011) [17, 18]; N. Mazun (2010) [25]; A. Maksymova 
(2012) [23]; V. Vovk (2013) [32]; B. Kyshakevych (2011) [21]; L. Danilova and V. Savochka (2014) [11]; 
S. Manzhos (2014) [24]; Yu. Diuba, A. Murina, (2015) [13]; B.Kyshakevych and O. Yuzvyak (2015) [22]; 
G. Bortnikov and O. Liubich (2016) [8] and others. Despite a strong methodological basis, there is virtually 
no research on stress testing of liquidity risk. 
In the work of Yu.Rebryk and M. Rebryk (2013), a scientific and methodical approach to scenario stress 
testing of liquidity of the bank is proposed, which provides an assessment of the state of all components of 
liquidity (individual components of liquidity, liquidity buffer, purchased liquidity and owner's resources) tak-
ing into account the influence of external shocks The obtained results provide an opportunity to define and 
form the necessary liquidity buffer, which will help the bank to remain financially sustainable even in the 
context of a systemic crisis [27]. 
I. Ivasiv, O.Fuksman (2014) developed an approach to liquidity stress testing standard values and internal 
liquidity limits that can be used as warning signals to prevent abuse external requirements of the regulator, 
according to a certain factor change rate [17]. 
E. Travkyna (2015) in [29] determines the important role of stress testing in monitoring the risk of liquidity. 
This indicates that stress testing liquidity risk involves the use macro model and sensitivity analysis of second-
tier banks to liquidity shocks. 
A.Kuznetsov and A.Pyitkin (2015) substantiate the feasibility of both historical and hypothetical stress sce-
narios liquidity. However, they indicated that hypothetical scenario in unstable situations can provide a stra-
tegic advantage to banks. Scenarios liquidity stress test should cover all areas of business where the possible 
outflow of liquidity in particular, have to take into account behavioral patterns of depositors; separately predict 
the outflow of funds from current and card accounts of individuals, funds of legal entities for all the products 
they use; anticipate the probability of non-expansion of deposits; take into account only real sources of funding 
to cover liquidity outflows [20]. 
Bearing in mind the importance of the problem of ensuring sufficient liquidity, the Basel Committee on Bank-
ing Supervision has developed recommendations for stress testing of liquidity [2]. 
In this document stress tests of liquidity of macro and micro level. Macro stress tests are part of the macro-
prudential toolkit that authorities may use to detect system-wide liquidity risks. Macro stress tests can be 
conducted either bottom-up or top-down. Bottom-up stress tests are conducted by banks, based on their own 
assumptions or on common scenarios designed by the central bank or supervisor for a horizontal review. The 
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bodies of banking regulation, usually based on in-house models and common assumptions across firms and 
supervisory and/or publicly available data, conduct top-down stress tests. In practice, most bodies of banking 
regulation conduct both top-down, bottom-up stress tests, as these are complementary, and allow for valuable 
crosschecks. At the micro level, large banks build their own bespoke liquidity risk stress tests; small and 
medium-sized banks use off-the-shelf models. The results of stress testing including are used for the definition 
and composition of liquidity buffers available to absorb liquidity stress. Modern approach goes towards asset 
liquidity (rather than liability liquidity) taking into account that in the crisis several asset classes turned out to 
be less liquid than expected. 
In paper Е. Wong and С. Hui (2009) develop a framework for stress-testing banks’ liquidity risk, where li-
quidity and default risks can stem from market risk arising from asset price shocks. The framework quantifies 
liquidity risk by estimating the expected cash shortage time and the expected default time of banks.  The 
stress-testing framework explicitly captures the link between default risk and deposit outflows, not only are 
the interaction of the risks incorporated but also their contagious effects [33].   
D. Aikman et al. (2009) provide a tractable stress-testing approach to modeling funding liquidity risks, sol-
vency risk, and externalities through spillover effects due to interbank exposures. In their framework, rules of 
thumb are used to impose funding constraints once banks’ balance sheets deteriorate beyond certain exoge-
nous thresholds [5]. In paper C. Gauthier, M. Souissi, & X. Liuc (2014) expanded the model Aikman et al. 
(2009) and model Е.  ong and С. Hui (2009). They provided analytical underpinnings for the link between 
solvency risk, market liquidity risk, and funding liquidity risk, rather than relying on exogenous thresholds 
[15].  
The results of the study of stress testing of banks 'liquidity showed that the focus was on assessing the ade-
quacy of banks' liquidity reserves (so-called liquidity buffers) to cover significant outflows in the short-term 
period. This is because during the crisis periods, the banks' liquidity deficit is covered by primary and second-
ary liquidity reserves, as the money market acquisitions become inaccessible. 
Based on this much of the research is devoted to the study of liquidity buffer, the factors that determine its 
size and sufficiency to cover liquidity shortages. 
R. Cifuentes, Hyun Song Shin & Gianluigi Ferrucci (2005) suggest that liquidity buffer requirements may be 
more effective than capital buffers in forestalling systemic crises. During periods of major financial distress, 
even a large capital buffer may be insufficient to prevent contagion as assets can only be sold at a discount. 
Requirements to maintain a stock of liquid assets can internalise some of the negative externalities that are 
generated by the price impact of selling less liquid assets [10]. 
Chen I-Ju & Phuong Nguyen Lan (2013) [9] investigated factors that determine of the size of the liquidity 
buffer in banks. They examined the impact of bank loan-related operations, bank characteristics, macroeco-
nomic fundamentals, and regulatory policy on the bank liquidity buffer. They revealed demand for liquidity 
is countercyclical, and bank excess liquidity runs counter to the business cycle. The level of bank liquidity 
buffer increases during a period of crisis. 
In order to increase the efficiency of liquidity risk management A.Ushanov (2016)  suggested to calculate and 
maintaine the stress-buffer of liquidity, which may require the bank in critical operating conditions, such as 
in the case of unpredictable payments on customer deposits [30]. 
Study M. Sun (2018) focuses on the portfolio allocation and liquidity buffer and how they are affected by the 
liquidation cost and risk preference. The key result of his research is the employment of framing effect in the 
classic bank run model and the analysis of determinants of liquidity buffer that a bank should hold in the face 
of funding liquidity shock. The author identified  that liquidity buffer could not be a constant variable which 
represents the absolutely optimal value of liquidity holding in commercial banks, while the liquidity buffer 
should be dynamic and adjustable under different economic circumstances. He considers, it is also necessary 
to study the framing effect of general depositors, especially institutional wholesale lenders, and incorporate 
the effect into the modeling of bank run and more extensive banking crisis [28].   
Currently, the formation of liquidity buffers is given great importance to regulators. Committee of European 
Banking Supervisors developed guidelines are focused on liquidity buffers. In them it is determined that li-
quidity risk management in banks should use of a broad range of measures including, among others, stress-
test-based liquidity buffers or refinancing limits for shorter and longer periods and contingency planning. The 
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document elaborate upon the appropriate size and composition of liquidity buffers to enable credit institutions 
to withstand a liquidity stress for a period of at least one month without changing their business models [3]. 
A separate line of research is devoted to the study of the specifics of the of Banks' Liquidity Buffers of differ-
ent countries.  
The results of study C.  Delechat, C. Arbelaez, P. Muthoora, S. Vtyurina (2012) [12] reveal that banks’ liquid-
ity holdings are comfortably above legal or prudential requirements in Central America, Panama and the Do-
minican Republic. Using a panel of about 100 commercial banks from the region in 2006-2010, they found 
that the demand for precautionary liquidity buffers is associated with measures of bank size, profitability, 
capitalization, and financial development. Important for the Ukrainian banking system is their conclusion that 
deposit dollarization is also associated with higher liquidity, reinforcing the monetary policy and market de-
velopment challenges in highly dollarized economies. Improvements in supervision and measures to promote 
dedollarization, including developing local currency capital markets, would help enhance financial systems’ 
efficiency and promote intermediation in the region. 
C. Bonner, I. van Lelyveld & R. Zymek (2013) [6, 7] based on a sample of 7,000 banks in 30 OECD countries, 
argue that banks’ liquidity buffers are determined by a combination of both bank- and country-specific varia-
bles. The results of the study, obtained by authors identified the presence of liquidity regulation substitutes 
for most of these determinants while complementing the role of size and institutions’ disclosure requirements. 
The complementary nature of disclosure and liquidity requirements provides a strong rationale for considering 
them jointly in the design of regulation. 
N. Gorelaya & K. Kuznetsova (2017) using bank level data, analyze the impact of different factors on the 
liquidity buffer as created by commercial banks. The regression results indicated that bank size and the sus-
tainability of bank sources reduce the amounts of liquid assets on the bank’s balance sheet. On the other hand, 
a return on assets and credit risk ratios increase the size of the liquidity buffer because banks increase the loan 
volume and they are supposed to have a high level of loan losses by trying to invest more resources in liquid 
assets. No convincing statistical proof was found for the theoretical hypothesis that the influence of the bank 
ownership, whether state or foreign-owned, or the deposit insurance coverage are significant. They find that 
macroeconomic conditions (GDP growth, funding rate, and crisis) are also significant for the liquidity state-
ment of Russian banks. The finding suggests that the process of creating the liquidity buffer is procyclical, 
meaning that banks accumulate liquidity in times of economic recovery and spend it during a crisis period 
[16]. 
Methodology and data 
The article is prepared using the theoretical-analytical approach. It contains the analysis of the literature on 
the theory of liquidity risk of banks and stress testing of liquidity risk. 
Based on the approach of Z.Komárková, A. Gershl, L. Komarek (2011) [19], within this study we distinguish 
between liquidity (of any kind) and liquidity risk. Liquidity is a binary notion, since a bank or market is, or is 
not, liquid at a particular time point. On the other hand, liquidity risk is defined as the possibility that the bank 
will become illiquid or market – a variable that is measured over a certain time period. Liquidity risks are 
heterogeneous in their structure. According to M. Drehmann and K. Nikolaou (2009) [14], the risk of liquidity 
financing is the risk of a bank's failure to settle its obligations. 
The risk of market liquidity arises from the inability of the bank to close the position (to realize the asset) at 
market price. It is based on the ability of assets to be transformed into cash, with this transformation taking 
place within the existing market, and its effectiveness (speed and absence of unacceptable losses) is condi-
tioned both by the state of the asset itself and by market conditions at a specific time. Assets can be liquid at 
a specific time, but at other times the prices for them can be significantly reduced.  
In the context of developing a stress testing model, it is important to conclude that the bank's liquidity risk is 
closely related to the ability to convert assets into cash without unacceptable losses (market liquidity). In 
addition, since the relationship between market liquidity and liquidity of funding is bilateral, there is potential 
for the feedback effect, and the liquidity shock for one bank can be spread across the interbank channel and 
lead to an increase in systemic liquidity risk. 
For the research, the model of J. V. Van den End (2008) [31] was used. Its model is based on the repeated 
counting of liquidity buffers after the impact of several types of shocks, combining market risks of the market 
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and financing liquidity of banks, and the feedback between them leads to a secondary impact of market vio-
lations on banks. His achievements were developed in the work of Z. Komárková, A. Gershl, L. Komarek 
(2011) [19] with a number of changes, determined both by the available analytical  
data and the specifics of the functioning of banking systems. First, the model of J.V. Van den End (2008) 
includes a combined approach to stocks and cash flows, whereas in the absence of reporting data in the work 
of Z. Komárková, A. Gershl, L. Komarek (2011) only the stock of liquid assets. Secondly, the shocks of the 
first round take into account both the reduced value of assets, on the one hand, and the growth of the amount 
of loans, on the other (both increase the need for financing), while the model J. V. Van den End (2008) takes 
into account only the first case. The third group of differences is related to the assumption of the banks' reac-
tions and the trigger for these reactions. Model J. V. Van den End (2008) assumes that banks adopt regulatory 
measures (sale of securities, issue of additional securities or replacement of certain assets or liabilities by other 
clauses) if the decline of the liquidity buffer after the first round of effects violates a certain threshold. In the 
work of Z. Komárková, A. Gershl, L. Komarek (2011), it is assumed that banks react when cash and deposits 
(or other accounts receivable) of the central bank are exhausted. 
Within the framework of this research, the approach was adapted to the specifics of the functioning of Ukrain-
ian banks, in particular, the composition of primary and secondary liquidity buffers was reviewed in accord-
ance with the financial reporting data. 
The stress test model is based on three phases: formation of the liquidity deficit in the balance as a primary 
effect of the shocks; Bank reactions to shocks; feedback effects from shocks. 
According to the model, the liquidity buffer is calculated and the banks have sufficient liquid assets to cover 
the liquidity deficit. 
This test may use prudential oversight bodies as an appropriate alternative to existing instruments for assessing 
liquidity risk (primarily, liquidity ratios set by banking regulation and oversight authorities). The model can 
be used to quantify the effect of liquidity on individual banks or the banking system as a whole. 
Figure 1. Scheme of stress testing of liquidity of the bank 
Figure 1 depicts a basic stress-testing scheme for the proposed approach. The model used in the work involves 
the sequential realization of three stages. 
At the first stage, we calculate the initial liquidity buffer of the bank's assets by the formula (1). 
ܮܤ଴ ൌ ෍ ܮ஻௜,
ସ
௜ୀଵ
                                                                                                                                                               ሺ1ሻ  
where i – a separate element of the balance, B – separate bank,  I – articles consisting of primary and secondary 
liquidity reserves: (1) cash and cash equivalents, (2) funds of the bank's mandatory reserves in the NBU, (3) 
funds in other banks, (4) trading securities. 
At this stage, it is necessary to check the initial liquidity buffer at the threshold (R) – the indicator of liquidity 
deficit, calculated by the formula (2): 
continuity 1st round of shocks initial buffer of liquidity (1) 
liquidity buffer (2) 
weighing buffers liquidity 
by coefficient risk 
reaction of banks 
threshold value 
1st stage 
Stage 2 
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ܴ ൌ ܮ ∗ ݌ ൅ ܥ ∗ ܿ ൅ ܦ ∗ ݎ,                                                                                                                              (2) 
where L – loan portfolio of the bank; p – the growth rate of the loan portfolio; C – other financial assets; c – 
share of overdue loans; D – deposits; r – withdrawal rate. 
The next step is to compare the size of the liquidity gap (R) with the initial liquidity buffer (LB0) (formula 
3):௅஻బ
ோ
൒ 1                                                                                                                                                                           ሺ3ሻ 
If this condition is fulfilled, the bank is able to withstand the first round of shocks, its liquidity buffer of assets 
is sufficient, which allows it to move to the second stage. It needs to weigh the liquidity buffer on the risk 
factors (formula 4): 
ܮܤ଴ ൌ ෍ ܮ஻௜ ∗ ݄௜,
ସ
௜ୀଵ
                                                                                                                                                          ሺ4ሻ 
where ݄௜ risk ratio for the asset group. 
Since primary and secondary liquidity reserves are included in asset liquidity buffers, the risk factors will be 
0% and 10% respectively. Then compare the resulting liquidity buffer (2) with the liquidity deficit (R) indi-
cator by analogy with formula (3). If in this case the condition is fulfilled, this will indicate the high quality 
and adequacy of the bank's liquidity buffer. 
For the study, a group of banks with a state share has been selected, as its influence on the banking system is 
the most significant (as of 01.07.2017, the share of assets of a group of banks with a state share is 56% of 
assets of the banking system). Thus, in view of this, the state of liquidity of assets of JSB "Ukrgasbank", 
JSC  "Oschadbank", JSC "Ukreximbank" and PJSC "PrivatBank" was investigated. JSC "Ukrainian Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development" and PJSC "Settlement Center" were not included in the stress-testing 
model, since their share of assets in the banking system is insignificant (less than 1%). The empirical analysis 
covers five years (2012-2016) and is based on the annual data presented in Appendix A. 
Results 
According to the model of stress-testing in the first stage it is necessary to calculate the initial buffer of liquid-
ity of banks assets by the formula (1). Figure 2 shows the results. 
  
Figure 2. Change in the liquidity buffers of assets of JSB "Ukrgasbank", JSC "Ukreximbank", JSC"Oschadbank", PJSC 
"PrivatBank" for 2012-2016, % 
During the study period, fluctuations of assets liquidity buffers in each investigated bank were observed. De-
tailed elements of the buffers of liquidity are given in Table 1. 
According to data, we see that in JSB "Ukrgasbank", starting from 2012, there was a decrease in the share of 
cash and cash equivalents from 12.3% to 4.62%. The share of funds in other banks increased from 3% in 2013 
to a maximum of 23.1% in 2015. At the last date of analysis, the highest value of the liquidity buffer is 
available in JSC "Oschadbank" - 19.5%, which is due to an increase in the share of cash and cash equivalents 
by 5 pp. 
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Table 1. Components of liquidity buffers JSB "Ukrgasbank", JSC "Ukreximbank", JSC"Oschadbank", 
PJSC"PrivatBank" for 2012-2016, % 
               Components 
years 
Cash and cash 
equivalents,% 
Funds of mandatory reserves 
of the bank in nbu,% 
Funds in other 
banks,% 
Trading 
chains,% Lb (liquidity buffer) 
JSB "Ukrgasbank" 
2012 12.31 0.17 7.68 5.66 25.83 
2013 8.67 0.57 3.01 2.20 14.45 
2014 9.34 0.00 3.82 3.84 17.00 
2015 9.55 0.00 23.10 0.00 32.65 
2016 4.62 0.00 12.15 0.00 16.77 
JSC "Oschadbank" 
2012 17.91 0.10 0.77 0.00 18.79 
2013 6.71 0.50 4.77 0.00 11.98 
2014 20.41 5.09 0.62 0.00 26.13 
2015 14.25 0.00 0.13 0.00 14.38 
2016 19.49 0.00 0.05 0.00 19.54 
JSC "Ukreximbank" 
2012 21.09 0.60 1.65 0.00 23.35 
2013 7.66 0.79 2.05 0.00 10.49 
2014 12.00 0.00 2.59 5.46 20.05 
2015 2.33 0.00 13.27 0.00 15.61 
2016 4.11 0.00 7.58 0.00 11.69 
PJSC"PrivatBank" 
2012 15.63 0.72 0.90 0.00 17.25 
2013 14.99 0.73 1.63 0.00 17.35 
2014 13.23 0.00 0.60 0.00 13.83 
2015 13.69 0.00 0.97 0.00 14.65 
2016 14.17 0.00 0.99 0.00 15.16 
The lowest value of the liquidity buffer in 2016 was observed in JSC "Ukreximbank" - 11.7%, which was 
caused by a reduction in the share of cash and cash equivalents from 21% to 4.1%. 
PJSC"PrivatBank", on average, had the lowest level of liquidity buffer in the group, ranging from the maxi-
mum in 2012 - 17.3% to the minimum in 2014 - 13.8%. This bank has the lowest share of funds in other banks 
in the group, which did not exceed 1%. For the transition to the second stage, it is necessary to calculate the 
asset liquidity deficit (R) by formula (2) and formula (3) and compare it with the available liquidity buffer in 
absolute terms. Table 2 shows the corresponding calculations. 
Table 2. Calculation of the first round of shocks for 2012-2016 
JSB "Ukrgasbank" 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
LB0, thousand grn 5423299 3439026 3573945 13567049 9004060 
R, thousand grn 2228061 2453067 3280169 3804789 4959517 
LB0/R 2.43 1.40 1.09 3.57 1.82 
JSC "Oschadbank" 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
LB0, thousand grn 7651362 5892094 6854115 17371841 13963579 
R, тис.грн 5901483 6097741 9529601 12567899 14556869 
LB0/R 1.30 0.97 0.72 1.38 0.96 
JSC "Ukreximbank" 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
LB0, thousand grn 13552846 11989836 16383716 29939741 28520448 
R, thousand grn 7011408 6335656 6882708 7757726 7483182 
LB0/R 1.93 1.89 2.38 3.86 3.81 
PJSC"PrivatBank" 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
LB0, thousand grn 20564255 18325494 23266427 37697471 36003634 
R, thousand grn 17304678 21109996 20668823 20565556 50086645 
LB0/R 1.19 0.87 1.13 1.83 0.72 
The results obtained during the first round of stress testing allow us to conclude that there is a sufficient level 
of liquidity buffer in JSB "Ukrgasbank" and JSC "Ukreximbank", since LB0 / R was> 1 for all reporting dates. 
JSC "Oschadbank" only survived the impact of shock in 2012 and 2015, in other cases LB0 / R was <1. An 
insufficient liquidity buffer was also recorded in PJSC"PrivatBank", which in 2013 and 2016 had a buffer 
ratio to a liquidity deficit ratio of 0.87 and 0.72. 
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By the second stage JSB "Ukrgasbank" and JSC "Ukreximbank" pass, which endured the first round of shocks. 
At this stage, it is necessary to weigh the liquidity buffer of assets on the risk factors by the formula (4). 
Primary reserves, namely cash and cash equivalents, funds of mandatory reserves of the bank in the NBU, 
funds in other banks are weighted by 0%, trading securities - by 10%. As a result, the risk weighted risk of 
liquidity of assets of the JSB "Ukrgasbank" will be 0.5% in 2012, and in 2016 the bank lost 100% of the 
buffer. A similar situation with JSC "Ukreximbank", which will have a liquidity buffer only in 2014 at 0.5%. 
None of the banks selected for analysis could not resist a second round of shocks. 
Conclusions and discussion 
The presented approach to stress testing is a tool that should be used to determine the negative impact of 
liquidity shocks on banks. For the purpose of the research, the model of J. V. Van den End (2008), developed 
in the work of Z. Komárková, A. Gershl, L. Komarek (2011) was used. Within the framework of this research, 
the approach was adapted to the specifics of the functioning of Ukrainian banks, in particular, the composition 
of primary and secondary liquidity buffers was reviewed in accordance with the financial reporting data. 
The approach developed by these scholars has been tested on a group of state-owned banks (JSB "Ukrgas-
bank", JSC "Oschadbank", JSC "Ukreximbank" and PJSC "PrivatВank"), whose influence on the banking 
system of Ukraine is most significant. The results of the model showed that banks with a state share are not 
sufficiently protected from liquidity risk. Even with a liquidity buffer of 15-20% for state-owned banks, this 
was not enough to counteract the potential for liquidity stress. The impact of the first round of shocks was 
significant, as only JSB "Ukrgasbank" and JSC "Ukreximbank" could withstand it. The sensitivity of these 
banks to the influence of the second round was extremely high. After weighing the buffers on the risk factors, 
they lost almost 100% of the buffers, signaling their lack of quality, as these banking institutions were unable 
to cover further increases in the requirements of available liquidity reserves. Consequently, the main result of 
the study is the conclusion that even with a sufficient amount of liquidity buffers of assets with banks with a 
state share, their quality remains at a rather low level, the share of secondary reserves is critically low. 
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Appendix A 
Table A.1. Components of liquidity buffers JSB "Ukrgasbank", JSC "Ukreximbank", JSC"Oschadbank", 
PJSC"PrivatBank" for 2012-2016, thousand hryvnias 
     Components 
  
 
Years Cash and cash 
equivalents 
Funds in mandatory 
reserves of the bank 
in the National Bank 
of Ukraine 
Funds with other 
banks Trading securities Total assets 
JSB "Ukrgasbank" 
2012 2585243.92 36391.13 1613111.75 1188551.76 20997237.51 
2013 2063873.14 134460.43 716710.60 523982.07 23793944.04 
2014 1964775.58 0.00 802564.49 806604.65 21027911.86 
2015 3967980.00 0.00 9599068.53 0.00 41555340.05 
2016 2482132.47 0.00 6521927.55 0.00 53681057.71 
JSC "Oschadbank" 
2012 15405005.86 83555.58 666161.34 0.00 85995535.84 
2013 6949439.00 520834.90 4941295.03 0.00 103568090.06 
2014 26151208.08 6524124.30 792634.99 0.00 128103752.06 
2015 22707602.00 0.00 210850.61 0.00 159389351.37 
2016 40954293.60 0.00 97110.54 0.00 210099278.11 
JSC "Ukreximbank" 
2012 18546661.63 531151.93 1454175.85 0.00 87948877.55 
2013 7222975.37 740956.57 1930220.28 0.00 94349056.75 
2014 15116962.51 0.00 3264178.71 6882114.62 125999826.80 
2015 3294142.00 0.00 18755020.43 0.00 141285440.01 
2016 6592738.12 0.00 12150480.26 0.00 160303832.26 
PJSC "PrivatBank" 
2012 26957510.93 1238198.77 1554310.05 20.14 172428712.41 
2013 32157250.86 1565643.27 3486202.79 18.20 214490857.48 
2014 27075551.26 758.77 1220105.77 29.09 204585002.61 
2015 36260225.00 0.00 2558320.13 0.00 264886279.03 
2016 31185136.51 0.00 2178625.67 0.00 220017620.55 
Table A.2. Data for calculating the liquidity deficit JSB "Ukrgasbank", JSC "Ukreximbank", JSC"Oschad-
bank", PJSC"PrivatBank" for 2012-2016 
 
Components 
 
 
Years 
L. thousand 
hryvnias P. % 
C.  thousand 
hryvnias c.% 
D.  thousand 
hryvnias r.  units 
R.  thousand 
hryvnias 
JSB "Ukrgasbank" 
2012 8675120.69 0.54 1467472.25 26.03 7023617.63 0.26 2228060.66 
2013 10257720.78 1.18 1948818.95 18.73 8698687.92 0.23 2453066.75 
2014 10034858.46 0.98 49600.91 35.56 12368091.12 0.26 3280169.10 
2015 14029078.05 1.40 245140.65 19.20 27510140.15 0.13 3804788.77 
2016 20398636.97 1.45 242735.26 14.26 46180965.80 0.10 4959516.81 
JSC "Oschadbank" 
2012 51186647.25 1.01 2205122.48 11.82 39399132.48 0.13 5901482.73 
2013 51546229.48 1.01 298898.28 5.94 46340929.31 0.12 6097740.78 
2014 69271838.30 1.34 245358.03 20.17 55368183.41 0.15 9529600.58 
2015 65687092.88 0.95 1273228.99 27.45 93437692.73 0.12 12567898.93 
2016 66194494.30 1.01 1217735.41 24.09 144419249.81 0.09 14556868.68 
JSC "Ukreximbank" 
2012 42273618.08 1.05 191048.98 10.67 44840799.96 0.15 7011407.70 
2013 42273618.08 1.00 629029.62 10.00 42970257.50 0.14 6335655.81 
2014 52093575.46 1.23 572553.24 19.45 60125796.49 0.10 6882708.09 
2015 55038771.97 1.06 393676.58 28.99 77679021.56 0.09 7757725.74 
2016 58426563.90 1.06 528673.47 28.49 83770729.06 0.08 7483181.77 
PJSC "PrivatBank" 
2012 113725691.54 0.94 2475773.31 14.64 106342198.18 0.15 17304678.44 
2013 142548091.67 1.25 29828737.10 11.05 133551099.98 0.12 21109996.12 
2014 161338725.51 1.13 9275042.37 11.44 141338369.21 0.13 20668822.67 
2015 177810480.90 1.10 12318997.98 10.54 178121357.31 0.10 20565555.95 
2016 54691631.45 0.31 39288224.06 73.18 180945877.43 0.12 50086644.94 
